Abstract. In this paper we study the endogenous determination of monopoly price. Our proposed game of endogenous monopoly-price setting extends the literature on monopoly-price, monopoly rent-seeking contests and monopoly rent-seeking rent-avoidance contests by (i) determining the monopoly price such that it maximizes a composite utility function that depends on two components: expected social welfare and lobbying efforts. The welfare component has a positive or no effect on the utility while the lobbying efforts have a positive, negative or no effect on the utility (ii) introducing the political culture of the government and clarifying its role in the endogenous determination of monopoly price. In the proposed model the single parameter representing political culture is the weight assigned to the enhancement of social welfare. Our main concern is with the study of the relationship between this parameter and the proposed monopoly price and, in turn, the rentseeking rent-avoidance efforts of the potential monopoly and the consumers and their aggregate expected benefit.
Introduction
In representative democracies monopoly price is determined by a political process that reflects the interest of the government (a bureaucrat, a regulator, a politician) that proposes the pricing policy and the pressures exerted by the producer, the potential monopoly, and by the consumers on the ruling politicians who approve or reject the proposed price. The producer is interested in securing the rent associated with the approval of the proposed price while the consumers prefer that the proposed price be rejected, thus avoiding a reduction in their surplus.
Our proposed game of monopoly regulation extends the existing models in the literature on monopoly-price, Tirole (1988) , monopoly rent-seeking contests, Kruger (1974 ), Peltzman (1976 ), Posner (1975 ), Tullock (1980 , Tollison (1982) and monopoly rent-seeking rent-avoidance contests, Appelbaum and Katz (1986a), Baik (1999) , Ellingsen (1991) , Paul and Wilhite (1991) , Schmidt (1992) and Wenders (1987) by:
(i) Determining the monopoly price assuming that it maximizes a composite utility function that depends on two components: the expected social welfare and the lobbying efforts exerted by the interest groups. The welfare component has a positive or no effect on the utility while the total lobbying outlays have a positive, negative or no effect on the utility. (ii) Introducing the political culture of the government and clarifying its role in the endogenous determination of monopoly price. The weights assigned to each of the components can be interpreted as the political culture of the government.
Our model has an alternative interpretation that can clarify the roles played by bureaucrats, incumbent politicians, potential monopolies and consumers on the endogenous determination of monopoly price. More specifically, the proposed framework enables a distinction between the role of the bureaucrat who proposes the monopoly price and the role of the incumbent politician who approves or rejects the proposal. The politician faces an information problem, viz., he lacks information regarding the costs and benefits of the proposal. His decision is therefore uncertain depending nevertheless on the efforts made by the interest groups to convince him to vote in favor or against the proposed policy. Consequently, the bureaucrat and the interest groups consider the outcome of the lobbying contest they take part in to be uncertain.
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Our modeling of the endogenous determination of monopoly price is related to the approach proposed by Appelbaum and Katz (1986b) , namely, that governments seek rents by setting rents and, more generally, to the recent literature on optimal contest design (Amegashie 1999; Baye et al. 1993; Clark and Riis 1998; Dasgupta and Nti 1998; Gradstein 1998; Morgan 1998; Nitzan 1994) , where the structure of the contest is determined by a politician. It is also related to the strategic trade literature (Grossman and Helpman 1994; Rodrik 1994; Rama and Tabellini 1995) and to the earlier non-strategic trade literature (Hillman 1982 (Hillman , 1989 Mayer 1984; Rodrik 1986 ) where trade policy is endogenously determined by elected politicians.
